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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3651 
___________ 
 
KIRANDEEP KAUR ANAND; JATINDER PAL SINGH ANAND; 
JANAM SINGH ANAND; HERSH SINGH ANAND, 
   Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
     Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A089-254-092, A092-781-153, A089-254-093, A089-254-094) 
Immigration Judge: Alberto J. Riefkohl 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 1, 2014 
Before:  FUENTES, COWEN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 5, 2014 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Kirandeep Kaur Anand (“Anand”), a citizen of India, petitions for review of an 
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed her appeal from an 
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) final removal order. We will deny the petition for review. 
2 
 
I. 
 Anand entered the United States in 2000, and sought asylum, withholding of 
removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture in 2008
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on behalf of herself and her family.
 2
  Anand and her family are Sikhs, and she applied for 
asylum based upon her father’s active support for Akali Dai (a Sikh political party).  
Anand asserted that, due to her father’s political activities and due to her family’s 
religious beliefs, she has suffered past persecution and has a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.   
 In support of this contention, Anand testified that, beginning in 1984, Hindus 
began threatening and verbally harassing her family.  After leaving India in 1985 for 
Kuwait and living both there and in the United States for a period of time, Anand 
returned to India in 1991.  The same year, her father was arrested at a political rally and 
was detained for 10 days and beaten.  In addition, Anand testified that in May 1991, she, 
her husband, and their daughter were in a car accident that resulted in the death of her 
daughter.  Anand claims the car accident was staged by Hindu extremists.  After the car 
accident, Anand and her family were harassed via telephone threats.  Gunshots were fired 
at their home.  In December 1992, Anand and her family left India for Kuwait, and they 
entered the United States in 2000.  Anand returned to India for three separate visits 
                                              
1
 The IJ found that the one-year limitations period for applying for asylum did not apply 
here as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
2
 Anand has two minor children, Janam Singh Anand and Hersh Singh Anand, and a 
husband, Jatinder Pal Singh Anand.  All of the members of the Anand family are citizens 
of India.  Jatinder, Janam, and Hersh Anand are seeking derivative relief through Anand’s 
application for asylum.  They also make independent claims for withholding of removal, 
relying on the identical facts relied upon by Anand in her asylum application.       
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between 1992 and 2000, each visit lasting approximately one month.  During a visit in 
1999, her father was again arrested and beaten.  Anand testified that the police said her 
family did not belong in India, and they threatened to take Anand and her mother to a 
“whorehouse” to work as prostitutes.     
 In July 2009, the IJ conducted a merits hearing.  The IJ, while finding Anand to be 
credible, denied her claims for relief.  The IJ noted that the harassment and verbal threats 
did not rise to the level of persecution and that, accordingly, Anand had not suffered past 
persecution.  Further, the IJ noted that Anand could not convincingly trace the car 
accident to Hindu extremists or connect the accident to Anand being a Sikh or her 
father’s political activities.  The IJ also noted that in light of Anand’s three visits to India, 
the continuing presence of her family in India, and the current makeup of the Indian 
government, Anand could not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution.  The 
BIA agreed.  It dismissed Anand’s appeal, and she filed a timely petition for review.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1252(a)(1).  Because the BIA affirmed and partially reiterated the IJ’s decision, we 
review the IJ’s decision along with the BIA’s decision.  See Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 
F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2nd Cir. 
2005).  We review the factual findings under the substantial evidence standard.  See 
Sandie, 562 F.3d at 251.  The BIA’s findings are “conclusive unless any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  
We exercise de novo review over the BIA’s legal decisions.  See Sandie, 562 F.3d at 251. 
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 To establish past persecution, an alien must show that she suffered “highly 
imminent and menacing” “threats to life, confinement, torture, [or] economic restrictions 
so severe that they constitute a real threat to life or freedom . . . on account of a statutorily 
protected ground, which includes imputed political opinion . . . .”  Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 
446 F.3d 508, 518 (3d Cir. 2006).  A well-founded fear of future persecution has both a 
subjective and objective aspect.  See Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 381 (3d Cir. 
2010).  To satisfy the objective prong, the applicant must show either that (1) she would 
be individually singled out for persecution or (2) there is a pattern or practice in the home 
country of persecuting similarly situated people.  Id.  To be eligible for withholding of 
removal under the CAT, Anand needed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that 
she would be tortured if removed to India.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). 
III. 
 Anand argues that she established past persecution on the basis of the threats she 
and her family were subjected to, the arrest and beating of her father on account of his 
political activities, shots fired at her family’s home, and the car accident that killed her 
daughter.  However, as the BIA concluded, threats alone, while surely abhorrent, are 
insufficient to establish past persecution.  See Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 164 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  Further, the arrest and beating of her father on two occasions did not 
constitute persecution of Anand and her family.  See Cham v. Att’y Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 
693 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 Regarding both the shots fired at her home and the car accident, the IJ and BIA 
concluded that the evidence did not establish that the car accident was intentional or that 
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it or the shots fired at her family’s home occurred due to her religious affiliation or 
imputed political opinion.
3
  Anand testified that the car accident occurred in front of a 
Hindu temple and that her mother-in-law received a telephone call indicating that Anand, 
her husband, and her daughter had perished in the crash.  Anand argues that these facts 
indicate that the other car targeted her and her family, as the telephone caller would have 
to have known of the accident and Anand’s contact information.     
 It is not entirely clear what the caller said to Anand’s mother-in-law.  On three 
separate occasions, Anand testified that the caller merely said that Anand, her husband, 
and her daughter were dead.  See A.R. 117-18, 157, 164; see also id. at 210 (declaration).  
However, she also testified that the caller said “just be ready, that we’ve done our job and 
they’re all gone.”  See A.R. 127.  While the IJ found Anand to be credible, he 
nevertheless concluded that Anand’s circumstantial evidence that the crash was staged 
was weak at best.  Specifically, the IJ and BIA noted that Anand did not see the driver of 
the other car and could not identify the caller.  Indeed, Anand’s assertions about the crash 
are speculative, and we are not compelled to disagree with the conclusion that Anand 
failed to show that she suffered past persecution on account of her religion or imputed 
political opinion.  See Al-Fara v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 733, 740 (3d Cir. 2005) (speculation 
is not an appropriate basis to establish past persecution); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).   
 Substantial evidence likewise supports the BIA’s conclusion that Anand failed to 
show that she possesses a well-founded fear of future persecution.  As Anand did not 
                                              
3
 No evidence was presented concerning who fired the shots, why and when they were 
fired, or if Anand was living in the house when they were fired. 
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suffer past persecution, she is not entitled to a presumption that she has a well-founded 
fear of future persecution.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1); see also Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 
329 F.3d 157, 174 (3d Cir. 2003).  Further, while it is clear that Anand subjectively fears 
returning to India, she cannot satisfy the objective prong.  See Huang, 620 F.3d at 381.  
The record establishes that: (1) Anand’s parents and two brothers continue to live in India 
and have suffered no harm; (2) Anand remained in India for two years after the car 
accident without suffering any harm, and was not persecuted during her return visits to 
India; and (3) Anand’s father, the purported source of the conflict, continues to live in 
India.  Anand’s family’s continued safety in India undermines her concerns of 
persecution should she return.  See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005).  
The record thus supports the BIA’s conclusion that Anand has failed to establish a well-
founded fear of future persecution should she be required to return to India.   
 Because Anand did not meet the standard for obtaining asylum, she also failed to 
satisfy the “higher burden of proof” required for withholding of removal.  See Chen v. 
Att’y Gen., 676 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 2011).  Finally, Anand has not shown that the 
record compels a finding that she would likely be tortured by, or with the acquiescence 
of, the Indian government if removed to India.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); Kaita v. 
Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 300 (3d Cir. 2008).  
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
